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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ALLEN STEEL COMPANY, a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff, Respondent, and
Cross-Appellant
Case No. 20532
vs.
DESERET TITLE HOLDING CORPORATION,
a Utah corporation, et al.,
Defendants and
Cross-Respondents,
[Continued on next page]

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING
OF CROSS-APPELLANT ALLEN STEEL
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE HONORABLE SCOTT DANIELS, PRESIDING

Bruce A. Maak, of Counsel
LARSEN, KIMBALL, PARR & CROCKETT
185 South State Street
Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellants
Crossroads Plaza Associates
and Equitable and CrossRespondent landowners
Wilford A. Beesley
BEESLEY & FAIRCLOUGH
1200 Beneficial Life Tower
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant
Okland-Foulger Co. and others
interested in Okland-Foulger

Joseph J. Palmer
H. Dennis Piercey
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and
CROSSROADS PLAZA ASSOCIATES,
a Utah joint venture,
THE EQUITABLE LIFE ASSURANCE
SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA, a New York corporation, and OKLAND-FOULGER COMPANY,
a general partnership,
Defendants and
Appellants.
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LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO PROCEEDING BELOW
Plaintiff, Respondent and Cross-Appellant:
ALLEN STEEL COMPANY
Defendant "Landowners11 and Cross-Respondents:
DESERET TITLE HOLDING CORPORATION, a Utah corporation
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, a body corporate and politic
DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION, a corporation
organized under the laws of the United States of America
ORIGINAL UTAH WOOLEN MILLS, a Utah corporation
CHRISTIANSEN ENTERPRISES, a general partnership
REVA L. CHRISTIANSON, an individual general partner of
Christiansen Enterprises
DARLENE C. JACKSON, an individual general partner of
Christiansen Enterprises
ROYAL L. TRIBE, an individual
RICHARD A. ISAACSON, an individual
JULIA M. SMOOT, an individual
JACK L. MECHAM, an individual
THELMA M. HINTZE, an individual
VERNER H. ZINIK, an individual
DONNA R. ZINIK, an individual
VERNER H. ZINIK, as Trustee,
Defendant "Developers," Appellants and Cross-Respondents:
a.

The joint venture:
CROSSROADS PLAZA ASSOCIATES, a Utah limited partnership

b.

Its partners:
THE EQUITABLE LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, a New York corporation
OKLAND-FOULGER COMPANY, a Maryland general partnership

c.

Parties interested in Okland-Foulger:
FOULGER PROPERTIES LIMITED, a Maryland limited
partnership
OKLAND PROPERTIES LIMITED, a Utah limited partnership
SID FOULGER, INC., a Maryland corporation
JACK OKLAND, INC., a Utah corporation
MARY FLINT FOULGER, an individual general partner of
Foulger Properties Limited
JAMES L. DAVIS and ANNE F. DAVIS, both individual
general partners of Foulger Properties Limited
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Defendant Lienholders;
COMMERCIAL TOWER ASSOCIATES, a Utah limited partnership
NORTHERN UTAH DRYWALL EQUIPMENT & SUPPLY, INC., a Utah
corporation
MERVIN YOUNG, an individual
HOWARD NELSON, d/b/a HOWARD NELSON DRYWALL
TIMMERMAN STEPAN ASSOCIATES, a Utah professional
corporation, d/b/a TIMMERMAN STEPAN ASSOCIATES
KERBS CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, A UTAH CORPORATION
VALLEY GYPSUM, INC., a Utah corporation
MARK REFRIGERATION, INC., a Utah corporation
FLINTBATEMAN CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Utah corporation
WON-DOOR CORPORATION, a Utah corporation
MAX LIEDKE, an individual
SOULE STEEL COMPANY, a California corporation
CECO CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation
CLARON D. BAILEY, an individual
JERALD M. TAYLOR, d/b/a TAYLOR ELECTRIC, INC.
DAHN BROTHERS, INC., a Utah corporation
UNIVERSAL ACCOUSTICS COMPANY, d/b/a UNIVERSAL ACCOUSTICS
OF SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, a Utah corporation
MONROC, a general partnership, consisting of M. K. HOLDING
CORP., a Delaware corporation, and WELLCOM FINANCIAL
SERVICES, a foreign corporation
Third Party Defendant:
JOSEPH F. PATRICK
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ALLEN STEEL COMPANY, a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff, Respondent, and
Cross-Appellant
Case No. 20532
vs.
DESERET TITLE HOLDING CORPORATION,
a Utah corporation, et al.,
• Defendants and
Cross-Respondents,
and
CROSSROADS PLAZA ASSOCIATES,
a Utah joint venture,
THE EQUITABLE LIFE ASSURANCE
SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA, a New York corporation, and OKLAND-FOULGER COMPANY,
general partnership,
Defendants and
Appellants

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING
OF CROSS-APPELLANT ALLEN STEEL

Cross-Appellant Allen Steel replies to the Answer of
Defendant-Appellant Okland Foulger Company to Petition for
Rehearing of Cross-Appellant Allen Steel and the Response to
Petition for Rehearing of Landowner Defendants,

This reply first

addresses Okland-Foulger Co.'s lack of standing and then
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Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

addresses the arguments point by point, first in the order
presented in the landowners1 response.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

OKLAND-FOULGER CO. HAS NO STANDING.

Allen Steel seeks enforcement of its lien against
interests of the landowners.1

Okland-Foulger Co. has filed a

response but is not a landowner; it was the lessee/contractor.
As such it has no standing on this issue involving only
landowners.

Okland-Foulger never addressed this issue at all in

this Court nor in the trial court.

Though perhaps not legally

significant, Okland-Foulger's interest in shielding the
landowners from the lien2 is a practical example of how certain
interests of an owner and a statutory agent/lessee are
intertwined.
POINT II. ALLEN STEELfS LIEN SHOULD BE ENFORCED AGAINST
THE LANDOWNERS.
What is not in the defendants1 responses is as
significant as what is.

(

The responses do not counter at all

Allen Steel's points that:
i

The landowners are listed on page i.
2

Allen Steel has judgment against Crossroads, Equitable
Life and Okland-Foulger, and a lien against their interests. The
remaining issue in this case is whether Allen Steel or the
landowners will be the "prevailing party" to determine which will
recover statutory attorneyfs fees from the other; if the
landowners prevail, the lessee/joint venturers, who represent the
landowners, will seek to offset what the joint venturers
otherwise owe. by the amount of the landowners1 attorneys1 fees.
1122S9.nibJtJfKfKply.asc
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1.

Other jurisdictions apply the simple, consistent

rule that the lessor's interest is subject to a lien when
the lessor requires the lessee to make the improvements.
See cases cited from eight jurisdictions in Allen Steel
Petition at 8-9, which overwhelming, uncontradicted
authority landowners here choose to ignore. Those cases
show, without question, that by exacting the promise to
construct from the lessee, the lessor is held, by
implication, to make the lessee his agent for accomplishing
the construction.
Agency for purposes of a mechanic!s lien is a

2.

broader principle than ordinary agency.

See Petition at 7-8

& n.7.
3.

A requirement of residual value at the end of the

lease makes the rule easy to draft around by lease language
requiring expensive improvements to be surrendered to the
lessor but expressly not requiring (only permitting) that
they have projected residual value.

Petition at 4.

These points were presented in the original petition for
rehearing and are not readdressed here except as necessary to the
reply.
A.

The landowners' interest is subject to the lien.

By reguiring in the leases that Crossroads Plaza Associates build
the shopping mall" and office building, the landowners impliedly
made the lessee. Crossroads, their agent to accomplish the
construction.
112289.mb.hdp.reply.asc
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National Bank v. Carlson, 23 Utah 2d 395, 464 P.2d 387 (1970)
requires that "an agreement, express or implied, exists between
the lessor or his agent and the contractor."

They contend that

it follows that Crossroads Plaza Associates was not an agent of
the landowners according to traditional contract principles and
therefore there can be no lien against the landowners.

This

overlooks that a statutory agency for mechanics1 lien purposes is
broader than,

and exists even in the absence of, a traditional

contract agency.

The concept of a broader statutory agency is

expressly recognized in Interiors Contracting, Inc. v. Navalco,
648 P.2d 1382 (Utah 1982).
Interiors Contracting observed that notwithstanding the
absence of an express contract between the lessor and the
contractor, the lessor still "may have made [the lessee] its
agent, at least to some extent, within the contemplation of the
mechanics1 lien statute."

648 P.2d at 1387 (emphasis added).

The Court relied on the statement in Masterson v. Roberts, 336
Mo. 158, 78 S.W.2d 856, 858 (1934) that:
When the owner . . .
alter the building .
alterations, he made
the contemplation of

clearly obligated the tenants to
. ., by reguiring substantial
these lessees his agents within
the mechanic f s lien statutes.

<

648 P.2d at 1388 (emphasis added).
The landowners then argue that the agency implied from
(

the requirement that the lessee construct the improvements is not
enough.

The rejoinder to this is that the statute, Utah Code

Ann. § 38-1-3, does not require more.

The landowners1 assert

1
U22S9.mbMp.reply.cisc
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that "a line of cases beginning in 1898 require[s] both that the
lease obligate the tenant to construct the improvements and that
the construction of the improvements confer a benefit upon the
landlord."

That is wrong.

First, the assertion incorrectly

assumes that a exacting a promise from the lessee to construct
the improvements does not in itself benefit the lessor.

All that

is required by the statute is construction by "any other person
acting by his [the owner's] authority."
§ 38-1-3.

Utah Code Ann.

As Zions First National correctly observed,

fl

[t]he

critical-issue . . . is whether Zions [the lessor] impliedly
authorized the . . . services and thus impliedly granted its
lessee authority to bind its fee interest."
464 P.2d at 389.

23 Utah 2d at 399,

As Zions First National demonstrates, that

authority is not diminished by the happenstance of later events
such as whether or not the construction is actually completed,
nor by what happens after an 85 year lease term if construction
does occur.

Id. at 395-99, 464 P.2d at 387-389.

If the

necessary authority is not express or implied, such as in a lease
requirement, then and only then it is appropriate for the trial
court to evaluate benefit to the landowers to determine whether
such authority is implied on some other basis.
significance of Interiors Contracting.

That is the

No such inquiry is needed

here where the lease implies agency by expressly requiring the
construction of the improvement.
Second, the landowners1 assertion misreads the Utah
cases.

If not limited to its statements that more than knowledge

U22S9Mib.hdp.Kpfy.asc
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of the lessor is required to bind the lessor, Morrow v. Merritt,
16 Utah 412, 52 P. 667 (1898), is squarely contrary3 to both
Zions First National, which did not cite Morrow, and Interiors
Contracting, which wisely did not cite Morrow for any proposition
having to do with lease requirements.

From beginning to end,

Zions First National could not be more supportive of Allen
Steel's position.

There, the owner, escaped the lien solely

because the improvements contemplated by the lease were not
required.
To restrict Interiors Contracting as defendants here
suggest imposes on lien claimants burdens not supported by the
statute and puts Utah at odds with the consistent rule followed
in other jurisdictions with like statutes.
Allen Steel Petition, 8-9.

See cases cited in

The landowners1 suggested rule would

necessitate in every case a separate inquiry into the economic
benefit to the owner based on speculative criteria that lend
themselves to inconsistent results.

That is not appropriate

where the owner, through an express lease requirement, was a
moving force behind the improvement, and unquestionably has the
benefit of that contractual commitment.
Rather, Interiors Contracting should be examined in
light of one element of vital importance to the decision —

the

Court was there reviewing a summary judgment against the lien

3

A factual distinction based on the fact that the lease in
Morrow only set out a certain dollar amount for improvements does
not seem to be a difference of principle.
U22S9.tnb.hdp.rrply.asc

6

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

claimants.

The Court stated:

"We conclude that there are

genuine issues of material fact which should be tried,"
at 1388.

648 P.2d

Without attempting to list all possible factual issues,

the Court referred to one that might arise as to improvements not
expressly required; i.e. whether the improvements "clearly and
actually conferred a value on Green Acres [the sublessor] when
Hungry Hawaiian [the sublessee] terminated its tenancy."

Those

factual questions, which were to be resolved by the trial court
are not important here except that the landowners try to confuse
those questions with the legal issue.

The legal issue in

Interiors Contracting, however, was stated clearly and succinctly
in the terms of the statute:

"The precise issue, therefore, is

whether the improvements made for Hungry Hawaiian [the sublessee]
were made 'at the instance of the owner,1 Green Acres [the
sublessor] 'or any other person acting by [its] authority as
agent, contractor or otherwise.1"

648 P.2d 1386.

The trial court here denied the lien on the sole ground
that "there is no evidence that they [the landowners] would
benefit from the construction of the Crossroads Project at the

4

The base lease was for ten years with a five year option.
648 P.2d at 1384. About three years later, part of the property
was subleased by Green Acres to Hungry Hawaiian, id., apparently
for the roughly 12 year balance of the original 15 year total,
id. at 1387. The Court was referring, not to anticipated value
at the end of the sublease term but rather to an early
termination of the sublease between Green Acres and Hungry
Hawaiian that had already occurred, presumably because the
sublessee's project failed financially, as it does not appear
that the sublessor had any interest at the end of the sublease
term. If the leases had gone full term, they would not have run
out yet.
H2289.mbJulp.pepty.asc
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end of the leases," Conclusions of Law, para. 18 at R 4604.5

The

trial court simply accepted the landowners1 argument that:
. • . Allen Steel Company must prove that its
improvements "actually conferred a value on [the owner]
when [Crossroads Plaza Associates] terminated its
tenancy." There is no evidence before the Court that
the improvements installed upon the owners1 property
will be of any value to the owners when the ground
leases terminate — in 2070. . . . Allen Steel's lien
must fail for lack of proof that the improvements, as
depreciated for 90 years, have value.
See Trial Brief of Equitable, Crossroads, Et Al. (7/25/84) at 4243.
• The landowners finally contend that "Allen Steel . . .
introduced no evidence of any benefit at any time to the
landowners from the construction of the improvements."
Landowners1 Response at 9.

However, they never dispute at all

the concomitant aspects of value6 that flow directly from the
undisputed and compelling evidence that the landowners expressly
required the improvements worth in excess of $4 0 million and
bargained for the right to the improvements at the end of the
lease.

Landowners suggest there should be evidence of when the

landowners could receive percentage rents.

The answer is simple

5

Findings of Fact, para., 2 at R 4594 similarly found "no
evidence that the useful life of the improvements extends beyond
the lease period or that the landowners will benefit from the
construction . . . . " See also the Court's comments at R 2935.
("[T]he reason I don't think the lien attaches to the landowner's
interest is because I don't think there's sufficient evidence
that they would benefit from the project, the lease being for
such a length of time.")
6

The value of the required improvements, for example,
as security is discussed in our petition at 3 & n.4.
112289. mbJuip. reply, asc
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—precisely at the time and in the amounts for which they
bargained.

It matters not a whit when, how much and under what

conditions they may receive those percentage rents.

The

landowners, architects of their own agreement in which they
required the improvements, are in no position to ask:

"How can

one say the landowners were benefited by the improvements if the
amount of the consideration flowing to the landowners is not
known[?]"
this:

Landowners' Response at 9.

Instead, the question is

If the landowners had leased the land for 90 years for no

consideration other than the promise of construction of the
Crossroads mall, garage, and tower could the landowners now say
the contract is void for lack of consideration?7

They say, "We

made them spend tens of millions of dollars, but not for any good
it would do us."
Allen Steel's evidence shows exactly what is necessary
for the lien, i.e., in the words of Interiors Contracting and the
statute, that the improvements were provided at the instance of a
person acting by the landowner's "authority as agent, contractor
or otherwise."

648 P.2d at 1386.

The essential nature of the

landowner's benefit was their expectation that this deal would
turn out well for them.

Landowners are not entitled to a

guarantee that they will come out ahead in the long run on a
commercial development that they caused to occur.

The landowners

claim of "absolutely no benefit" could not have a more hollow

One cannot refuse to pay the commission to the stock
broker because the stock goes down.
1 l22S9.ntbJiiip.ivpfy.asc
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ring.

"[A]fter the fact, disclaiming any benefit from the

improvements is not timely and is self-serving."

Markely v.

General First Equipment, 17 Wash. App. 480, 563 P.2d 1316, 1319
(1977).

The landowners got what they bargained for and should be

held subject to the lien.
B.
landowners.

The arguments of Okland-Foulger do not help the
Okland-Foulger makes two additional arguments.

First, it contends "contractual benefits under the lease
agreements . . . are not part of the freehold."

A lessor's

interest, whatever it is, may be liened, and a remaining interest
at the end of the stated lease term is not necessary.8

The lien

attaches "to such interest as the owner may have in the
property," Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-3, not only, as Okland-Foulger
contends, to the owner's interest, after the end of the stated
lease period.

Nothing in the definitions cited by Okland-Foulger

restricts any "freehold" interest to only that later period;
during the lease, there is, in Okland-Foulger's words, "the
landowners' title and ownership . . . encumbered by the leases
and improvements,"

Okland-Foulger Answer to Petition at 4, as

well as the right to the rents reserved.
Second, Okland-Foulger contends that Allen Steel has
failed to satisfy the requirements for rehearing, but argues only
that Allen Steel is wrong on the merits.

If this Court

Interiors Contracting, as discussed supra at 7 n.4,
treated as the "owner" a sublessor's interest that was
coextensive in time with the sublessee's interest.
U22S9.ntb.hdp.irply.asc
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determines that Allen Steel is right on the merits, imposition of
the lien on the landowners is appropriate.

Okland-Foulgerfs

statement that "Allen Steel's emphasis in its Brief • . . was not
to consider benefits during the lease term" mischaracterizes
Allen Steel's argument, which is in our cross-appellant's brief
at 29-34 and our reply brief at 7-16.

Even the landowners'

response refutes Okland-Foulger's assertion that Allen Steel has
changed its position by observing that Allen Steel did advance
these same arguments on appeal.
. C.

Landowners' Response at 3.

Allen Steel's Notice of Lien was proper for the

Crossroads' proiect.

The trial court found that "[t]he

buildings, consisting of the Mall, garage and tower, cannot
reasonably be apportioned as to the amount of construction or
value of each owner's property," Findings of Fact, para. 2 at
R 4594; see also R 2935.

All of the authority involving

separately owned tracts used jointly for a common improvement
uphold a common notice of lien.

Allen Steel Reply Brief at 3.

Likewise, the only authority cited by any party demonstrates that
a statute such as Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1 applies when the
construction is not for a public purpose.
Brief at 6.

Allen Steel Reply

The Crossroads Project is by no means a "public

building, structure, or improvement.,r

Regardless, that a tiny

piece of the land under the mall is owned by the City does not
destroy the lien on the other private land. On these issues, we
respectfully refer the Court to pages 2-7 of our reply brief,
where our responses are fully set out.

1 l22S9.mb.h<ip.rrply.asc
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CONCLUSION
The landowners required the multi-million dollar
improvements, making the lessee their statutory agent to
construct it by implication.

Allen Steel's lien should be upheld

because that is the result consistent with Zions First National
and Interiors Contracting, consistent with the statute, and
consistent with the uncontradicted, undistinguished and
established rule in other jurisdictions with like statutes.
Alternatively, the case should be remanded to the trial court
with directions that (1) a residual benefit need not necessarily
be shown at the end of the stated lease period and (2) in light
of Allen Steel's showing of the lease requirement, the landowners
must bear the burden of establishing, if they so claim, that the
requirement did not benefit them.
DATED:

November 28, 1989.
Respectfully submitted,
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C.

is/

By

Joseph J~- Pslnner

Joseph J. Palmer
H. Dennis Piercey
Attorneys for Respondent and
Cross-Appellant Allen Steel
Co.
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